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Notions like meaning, signal, intentionality, are difficult to relate to a physical word. I study a
purely physical definition of “meaningful information”, from which these notions can be derived. It
is inspired by a model recently illustrated by Kolchinsky and Wolpert, and improves on Dretske
classic work on the relation between knowledge and information. I discuss what makes a physical
process into a “signal”.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a gap in our understanding of the world.
On the one hand we have the physical universe; on the
other, notions like meaning, intentionality, agency, pur-
pose, function and similar, which we employ for the like
of life, humans, the economy... These notions are ab-
sent in elementary physics, and their placement into a
physicalist world view is delicate [1], to the point that
the existence of this gap is commonly presented as the
strongest argument against naturalism.
Two historical ideas have contributed tools to bridge
the gap.
The first is Darwin’s theory, which offers evidence on
how function and purpose can emerge from natural vari-
ability and natural selection of structures [2]. Darwin’s
theory provides a naturalistic account for the ubiquitous
presence of function and purpose in biology. It falls sort
of bridging the gap between physics and meaning, or in-
tentionality.
The second is the notion of ‘information’, which is
increasingly capturing the attention of scientists and
philosophers. Information has been pointed out as a key
element of the link between the two sides of the gap, for
instance in the classic work of Fred Dretske [3].
However, the word ‘information’ is highly ambiguous.
It is used with a variety of distinct meanings, that cover
a spectrum ranging from mental and semantic (“the in-
formation stored in your USB flash drive is comprehen-
sible”) all the way down to strictly engineeristic (“the
information stored in your USB flash drive is 32 Giga”).
This ambiguity is a source of confusion. In Dretske’s
book, information is introduced on the base of Shannon’s
theory [4], explicitly interpreted as a formal theory that
“does not say what information is”.
In this note, I make two observations. The first is that
it is possible to extract from the work of Shannon a purely
physical version of the notion of information. Shannon
calls its “relative information”. I keep his terminology
even if the ambiguity of these terms risks to lead to con-
tinue the misunderstanding; it would probably be better
to call it simply ‘correlation’, since this is what it ulti-
mately is: downright crude physical correlation.
The second observation is that the combination of this
notion with Darwin’s mechanism provides the ground for
a definition of meaning. More precisely, it provides the
ground for the definition of a notion of “meaningful infor-
mation”, a notion that on the one hand is solely built on
physics, on the other can underpin intentionality, mean-
ing, purpose, and is a key ingredient for agency.
The claim here is not that the full content of what we
call intentionality, meaning, purpose –say in human psy-
chology, or linguistics– is nothing else than the meaning-
ful information defined here. But it is that these notions
can be built upon the notion of meaningful information
step by step, adding the articulation proper to our neu-
ral, mental, linguistic, social, etcetera, complexity. In
other words, I am not claiming of giving here the full
chain from physics to mental, but rather the crucial first
link of the chain.
The definition of meaningful information I give here is
inspired by a simple model presented by David Wolpert
and Artemy Kolchinsky [5], which I describe below. The
model illustrates how two physical notions, combined,
give rise to a notion we usually ascribe to the non-
physical side of the gap: meaningful information.
The note is organised as follows. I start by a careful
formulation of the notion of correlation (Shannon’s rela-
tive information). I consider this a main motivation for
this note: emphasise the commonly forgotten fact that
such a purely physical definition of information exists. I
then briefly recall a couple of points regarding Darwinian
evolution which are relevant here, and I introduce (one
of the many possible) characterisation of living beings.
I then describe Wolpert’s model and give explicitly the
definition of meaningful information which is the main
purpose of this note. Finally, I describe how this notion
might bridge between the two sides of gap. I close with a
discussion of the notion of signal and with some general
considerations.
II. RELATIVE INFORMATION
Consider physical systems A,B, ... whose states are de-
scribed by a physical variables x, y, ..., respectively. This
is the standard conceptual setting of physics. For sim-
plicity, say at first that the variables take only discrete
values. Let NA, NB, ... be the number of distinct values
that the variables x, y, ... can take. If there is no relation
or constraint between the systems A and B, then the pair
of system (A,B) can be in NA ×NB states, one for each
choice of a value for each of the two variables x and y. In
physics, however, there are routinely constraints between
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2systems that make certain states impossible. Let NAB be
the number of allowed possibilities. Using this, we can
define ‘relative information’ as follows.
We say that A and B ‘have information about one
another’ if NAB is strictly smaller than the product NA×
NB. We call
S = log(NA ×NB) − logNAB, (1)
where the logarithm is taken in base 2, the “relative in-
formation” that A and B have about one another. The
unit of information is called ‘bit’.
For instance, each end of a magnetic compass can be
either a North (N) or South (S) magnetic pole, but they
cannot be both N or both S. The number of possible
states of each pole of the compass is 2 (either N or S),
so NA = NB = 2, but the physically allowed possibilities
are not NA×NB = 2×2 = 4 (NN,NS, SN, SS). Rather,
they are only two (NS, SN), therefore NAB = 2. This is
dictated by the physics. Then we say that the state (N
or S) of one end of the compass ‘has relative information’
S = log 2 + log 2 − log 2 = 1 (2)
(that is: 1 bit) about the state of the other end. Notice
that this definition captures the physical underpinning
to the fact that “if we know the polarity of one pole of
the compass then we also know (have information about)
the polarity of the other.” But the definition itself is com-
pletely physical, and makes no reference to semantics or
subjectivity.
The generalisation to continuous variables is straight-
forward. Let PA and PB be the phase spaces of A and
B respectively and let PAB be the subspace of the Carte-
sian product PA×PB which is allowed by the constraints.
Then the relative information is
S = log V (PA × PB) − log V (PAB) (3)
whenever this is defined.1
Since the notion of relative information captures cor-
relations, it extends very naturally to random variables.
Two random variables x and y described by a probability
distribution pAB(x, y) are uncorrelated if
pAB(x, y) = p˜AB(x, y) (4)
where p˜AB(x, y) is called the marginalisation of pAB(x, y)
and is defined as the product of the two marginal distri-
butions
p˜AB(x, y) = pA(x) pB(y), (5)
1 Here V (.) is the Liouville volume and the difference between the
two volumes can be defined as the limit of a regularisation even
when the two terms individually diverge. For instance, if A and
B are both free particles on a circle of of size L, constrained
to be at a distance less of equal to L/N (say by a rope tying
them), then we can easily regularise the phase space volume by
bounding the momenta, and we get S = logN , independently
from the regularisation.
in turn defined by
pA(x) =
∫
pAB(x, y) dy, pB(y) =
∫
pAB(x, y) dx. (6)
Otherwise they are correlated. The amount of correlation
is given by the difference between the entropies of the
two distributions pA(x, y) and p˜A(x, y). The entropy of
a probability distribution p being S =
∫
p log p on the
relevant space. All integrals are taken with the Luoiville
measures of the corresponding phase spaces.
Correlations can exist because of physical laws or be-
cause of specific physical situations, or arrangements or
mechanisms, or the past history of physical systems.
Here are few examples. The fact that the two poles of
a magnet cannot have the same polarisation is excluded
by one of the Maxwell equations. It is just a fact of
the world. The fact that two particles tied by a rope
cannot move apart more than the distance of the rope
is a consequence of a direct mechanical constraint: the
rope. The frequency of the light emitted by a hot piece
of metal is correlated to the temperature of the metal at
the moment of the emission. The direction of the pho-
tons emitted from an object is correlated to the position
of the object. In this case emission is the mechanism
that enforces the correlation. The world teams with cor-
related quantities. Relative information is, accordingly,
naturally ubiquitous.
Precisely because it is purely physical and so ubiqui-
tous, relative information is not sufficient to account for
meaning. ‘Meaning’ must be grounded on something else,
far more specific.
III. SURVIVAL ADVANTAGE AND PURPOSE
Life is a characteristic phenomenon we observe on the
surface of the Earth. It is largely formed by individual
organisms that interact with their environment and em-
body mechanisms that keep themselves away from ther-
mal equilibrium using available free energy. A dead or-
ganism decays rapidly to thermal equilibrium, while an
organism which is alive does not. I take this –with quite
a degree of arbitrariness– as a characteristic feature of
organisms that are alive.
The key of Darwin’s discovery is that we can legiti-
mately reverse the causal relation between the existence
of the mechanism and its function. The fact that the
mechanism exhibits a purpose —ultimately to maintain
the organism alive and reproduce it— can be simply un-
derstood as an indirect consequence, not a cause, of its
existence and its structure.
As Darwin points out in his book, the idea is ancient.
It can be traced at least to Empedocles. Empedocles
suggested that life on Earth may be the result of ran-
dom happening of structures, all of which perish except
those that happen to survive, and these are the living
3organisms.2
The idea was criticised by Aristotle, on the ground that
we see organisms being born with structures already suit-
able for survival, and not being born at random ([6] II 8,
198b35). But shifted from the individual to the species,
and coupled with the understanding of inheritance and,
later, genetics, the idea has turned out to be correct.
Darwin clarified the role of variability and selection in
the evolution of structures and molecular biology illus-
trated how this may work in concrete. Function emerges
naturally and the obvious purposes that living matter ex-
hibits can be understood as a consequence of variability
and selection. What functions is there because it func-
tions: hence it has survived. We do not need something
external to the workings of nature to account for the ap-
pearance of function and purpose.
But variability and selection alone may account for
function and purpose, but are not sufficient to account
for meaning, because meaning has semantic and inten-
tional connotations that are not a priori necessary for
variability and selection. ‘Meaning’ must be grounded
on something else.
IV. KOLCHINSKY-WOLPERT’S MODEL AND
MEANINGFUL INFORMATION
My aim is now to distinguish the correlations that are
are ubiquitous in nature from those that we count as
relevant information. To this aim, the key point is that
surviving mechanisms survive by using correlations. This
is how relevance is added to correlations.
The life of an organisms progresses in a continuous ex-
change with the external environment. The mechanisms
that lead to survival and reproduction are adapted by
evolution to a certain environment. But in general en-
vironment is in constant variation, in a manner often
poorly predictable. It is obviously advantageous to be
appropriately correlated with the external environment,
because survival probability is maximised by adopting
different behaviour in different environmental conditions.
A bacterium that swims to the left when nutrients are
on the left and swims to the right when nutrients are on
the right prospers; a bacterium that swims at random has
less chances. Therefore many bacteria we see around us
are of the first kind, not of the second kind. This simple
observation leads to the Kolchinsky-Wolpert model [5],.
A living system A is characterised by a number of vari-
ables xn that describe its structure. These may be nu-
merous, but are in a far smaller number than those de-
scribing the full microphysics of A (say, the exact position
2 [There could be] “beings where it happens as if everything was
organised in view of a purpose, while actually things have been
structured appropriately only by chance; and the things that
happen not to be organised adequately, perished, as Empedocles
says”. [6] II 8, 198b29)
=
FIG. 1. The Kolchinsky-Wolpert model and the definition
of meaningful information. If the probability of descending
to thermal equilibrium P˜ increases when we cut the infor-
mation link between A and B, then the relative information
(correlation) between the variables x and y is “meaningful
information”.
of each water molecule in a cell). Therefore the variables
xn are macroscopic in the sense of statistical mechanics
and there is an entropy S(xn) associated to them, which
counts the number of the corresponding microstates. As
long as an organism is alive, S(xn) remains far lower
than its thermal-equilibrium value Smax. This capacity
of keeping itself outside of thermal equilibrium, utilising
free energy, is a crucial aspects of systems that are alive.
Living organisms have generally a rather sharp distinc-
tion between their state of being alive or dead, and we
can represent it as a threshold Sthr in their entropy.
Call B the environment and let yn denote a set of vari-
ables specifying its state. Incomplete specification of the
state of the environment can be described in terms of
probabilities, and therefore the evolution of the environ-
ment is itself predictable at best probabilistically.
Consider now a specific variable x of the system A and
a specific variable y of the system B in a given macro-
scopic state of the world. Given a value (x, y), and tak-
ing into account the probabilistic nature of evolution, at a
later time t the system A will find itself in a configuration
xn with probability px,y(xn). If at time zero p(x, y) is the
joint probability distribution of x and y, the probability
that at time t the system A will have entropy higher that
the threshold is
P =
∫
dxndx dy p(x, y) px,y(xn)θ(S(xn)− Sthr), (7)
where θ is the step function. Let us now define
P˜ =
∫
dxndx dy p˜(x, y) px,y(xn)θ(S(xn)− Sthr). (8)
where p˜(x, y) is the marginalisation of p(x, y) defined
above. This is the probability of having above thresh-
old entropy if we erase the relative information. This is
Wolpert’s model.
Let’s define the relative information between x and y
contained in p(x, y) to be “directly meaningful” for B
over the time span t, iff P˜ is different from P . And call
M = P˜ − P (9)
4the “significance” of this information. The significance
of the information is its relevance for the survival, that
is, its capacity of affecting the survival probability.
Furthermore, call the relative information between x
and y simply “meaningful” if it is directly meaningful
or if its marginalisation decreases the probability of ac-
quiring information that can be meaningful, possibly in
a different context.
Here is an example. Let B be food for a bacterium
and A the bacterium, in a situation of food shortage.
Let x be the location of the nurture, for simplicity say
it can be either at the left of at the right. Let y the
variable that describe the internal state of the bacterium
which determines the direction in which the bacterium
will move. If the two variables x and y are correlated
in the right manner, the bacterium reaches the food and
its chances of survival are higher. Therefore the cor-
relation between y and x is “directly meaningful” for
the bacterium, according to the definition given, because
marginalising p(x, y), namely erasing the relative infor-
mation increases the probability of starvation.
Next, consider the same case, but in a situation of
food abundance. In this case the correlation between x
and y has no direct effect on the survival probability,
because there is no risk of starvation. Therefore the
x-y correlation is not directly meaningful. However, it
is still (indirectly) meaningful, because it empowers the
bacterium with a correlation that has a chance to affect
its survival probability in another situation.
A few observations about this definition:
i. Intentionality is built into the definition. The infor-
mation here is information that the system A has
about the variable y of the system B. It is by def-
inition information “about something external”. It
refers to a physical configuration of A (namely the
value of its variable x), insofar as this variables is
correlated to something external (it ‘knows’ some-
thing external).
ii. The definition separates correlations of two kinds:
accidental correlations that are ubiquitous in nature
and have no effect on living beings, no role in se-
mantic, no use, and correlations that contribute to
survival. The notion of meaningful correlation cap-
tures the fact that information can have “value” in a
darwinian sense. The value is defined here a posteri-
ori as the increase of survival chances. It is a “value”
only in the sense that it increases these chances.
iii. Obviously, not any manifestation of meaning, pur-
pose, intentionality or value is directly meaningful,
according to the definition above. Reading today’s
newspaper is not likely to directly enhance mine or
my gene’s survival probability. This is the sense of
the distinction between ‘direct’ meaningful informa-
tion and meaningful information. The second in-
cludes all relative information which in turn increases
the probability of acquiring meaningful information.
This opens the door to recursive growth of mean-
ingful information and arbitrary increase of seman-
tic complexity. It is this secondary recursive growth
that grounds the use of meaningful information in the
brain. Starting with meaningful information in the
sense defined here, we get something that looks more
and more like the full notions of meaning we use in
various contexts, by adding articulations and mov-
ing up to contexts where there is a brain, language,
society, norms...
iv. A notion of ‘truth’ of the information, or ‘veracity’
of the information, is implicitly determined by the
definition given. To see this, consider the case of the
bacterium and the food. The variable x of the bac-
terium can take to values, say L and R, where L is
the variable conducting the bacterium to swim to the
Right and L to the Left. Here the definition leads to
the idea that R means “food is on the right” and L
means “food is on the left”. The variable x contains
this information. If for some reason the variable x is
on L but the food happens to be on the Right, then
the information contained in x is “not true”. This is
a very indirect and in a sense deflationary notion of
truth, based on the effectiveness of the consequence
of holding something for true. (Approximate coarse
grained knowledge is still knowledge, to the extent it
is somehow effective. To fine grain it, we need addi-
tional knowledge, which is more powerful because it
is more effective.) Notice that this notion of truth is
very close to the one common today in the natural
sciences when we say that the ‘truth’ of a theory is
the success of its predictions. In fact, it is the same.
v. The definition of ‘meaningful’ considered here does
not directly refer to anything mental. To have some-
thing mental you need a mind and to have a mind you
need a brain, and its rich capacity of elaborating and
working with information. The question addressed
here is what is the physical base of the information
that brains work with. The answer suggested is that
it is just physical correlation between internal and ex-
ternal variables affecting survival either directly or,
potentially, indirectly.
The idea put forward is that what grounds all this is
direct meaningful information, namely strictly physical
correlations between a living organism and the external
environment that have survival and reproductive value.
The semantic notions of information and meaning are ul-
timately tied to their Darwinian evolutionary origin. The
suggestion is that the notion of meaningful information
serves as a ground for the foundation of meaning. That
is, it could offer the link between the purely physical
world and the world of meaning, purpose, intentionality
and value. It could bridge the gap.
5V. SIGNALS, REDUCTION AND MODALITY
A signal is a physical event that conveys meaning. A
ring of my phone, for instance, is a signal that means
that somebody is calling. When I hear it, I understand
its meaning and I may reach the phone and answer.
As a purely physical event, the ring happens to phys-
ically cause a cascade of physical events, such as the vi-
bration of air molecules, complex firing of nerves in my
brain, etcetera, which can in principle be described in
terms of purely physical causation. What distinguishes
its being a signal, from its being a simple link in a phys-
ical causation chain?
The question becomes particularly interesting in the
context of biology and especially molecular biology. Here
the minute working of life is heavily described in terms of
signals and information carriers: DNA codes the infor-
mation on the structure of the organism and in particu-
lar on the specific proteins that are going to be produced,
RNA carries this information outside the nucleus, recep-
tors on the cell surface signal relevant external condition
by means of suitable chemical cascades. Similarly, the op-
tical nerve exchanges information between the eye and
the brain, the immune system receives information about
infections, hormones signal to organs that it is time to
do this and that, and so on, at libitum. We describe
the working of life in heavily informational terms at ev-
ery level. What does this mean? In which sense are these
processes distinct from purely physical processes to which
we do not usually employ an informational language?
I see only one possible answer. First, in all these pro-
cesses the carrier of the information could be somewhat
easily replaced with something else without substantially
altering the overall process. The ring of my phone can be
replaced by a beep, or a vibration. To decode its mean-
ing is the process that recognises these alternatives as
equivalent in some sense. We can easily imagine an al-
ternative version of life where the meaning of two letters
is swapped in the genetic code. Second, in each of these
cases the information carrier is physically correlated with
something else (a protein, a condition outside the cell, a
visual image in the eye, an infection, a phone call...) in
such a way that breaking the correlation could damage
the organism to some degree. This is precisely the defi-
nition of meaningful information studied here.
I close with two general considerations.
The first is about reductionism. Reductionism is often
overstated. Nature appears to be formed by a relative
simple ensemble of elementary ingredients obeying rel-
atively elementary laws. The possible combinations of
these elements, however, are stupefying in number and
variety, and largely outside the possibility that we could
compute or deduce them from nature’s elementary in-
gredients. These combinations happen to form higher
level structures that we can in part understand directly.
These we call emergent. They have a level of auton-
omy from elementary physics in two senses: they can
be studied independently from elementary physics, and
they can be realized in different manners from elemen-
tary constituents, so that their elementary constituents
are in a sense irrelevant to our understanding of them.
Because of this, it would obviously be useless and self
defeating to try to replace all the study of nature with
physics. But evidence is strong that nature is unitary
and coherent, and its manifestations are —whether we
understand them or not— behaviour of an underlying
physical world. Thus, we study thermal phenomena in
terms of entropy, chemistry in terms of chemical affin-
ity, biology in terms functions, psychology in terms of
emotions and so on. But we increase our understanding
of nature when we understand how the basic concept of
a science are ground in physics, or are ground in a sci-
ence which is ground on physics, as we have largely been
able to do for chemical bonds or entropy. It is in this
sense, and only in this sense, that I am suggesting that
meaningful information could provide the link between
different levels of our description of the world.
The second consideration concerns the conceptual
structure on which the definition of meaningful informa-
tion proposed here is based. The definition has a modal
core. Correlation is not defined in terms of how things
are, but in terms of how they could or could not be.
Without this, the notion of correlation cannot be con-
structed. The fact that something is red and something
else is red, does not count as a correlation. What counts
as a correlation is, say, if two things can each be of dif-
ferent colours, but the two must always be of the same
colour. This requires modal language. If the world is
what it is, where does modality comes from?
The question is brought forward by the fact that the
definition of meaning given here is modal, but does not
bear on whether this definition is genuinely physical or
not. The definition is genuinely physical. It is physics
itself which is heavily modal. Even without disturbing
quantum theory or other aspects of modern physics, al-
ready the basic structures of classical mechanics are heav-
ily modal. The phase space of a physical system is the list
of the configurations in which the system can be. Physics
is not a science about how the world is: it is a science of
how the world can be.
There are a number of different ways of understand-
ing what this modality means. Perhaps the simplest in
physics is to rely on the empirical fact that nature re-
alises multiple instances of the same something in time
and space. All stones behave similarly when they fall and
the same stone behaves similarly every time it falls. This
permits us to construct a space of possibilities and then
use the regularities for predictions. This structure can be
seen as part of the elementary grammar of nature itself.
And then the modality of physics and, consequently, the
modality of the definition of meaning I have given are
fully harmless against a serene and quite physicalism.
But I nevertheless raise a small red flag here. Because
we do not actually know the extent to which this struc-
ture is superimposed over the elementary texture of re-
ality by ourselves. It could well be so: the structure
6could be generated precisely by the structure of the very
‘meaningful information’ we have been concerned with
here. We are undoubtably limited parts of nature, and
we are so even as understanders of this same nature.
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